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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

No. 333

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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Petitioner, Pan American World Airways, Inc., asks that a writ of certiorari issue to review the decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered in this case on April 25, 1968.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 393 F.2d 441 and is annexed hereto as Appendix A. The opinions of the United State District Court for the Southern

District of New York are not officially reported and are annexed hereto as Appendix B.

Jurisdiction

The decree of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit here sought to be reviewed (App. A) was entered on April 25, 1968. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Question Presented

Whether the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") has primary jurisdiction over a claim that an unfiled alleged agreement between air carriers, the implementation of which had ceased prior to the time an action was begun in the District Court, violated the anti-trust laws and thereby gave rise to an action for damages.

Statutes Involved

Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. §1382) reads as follows:

> "(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every contract or agreement (whether enforceable by provisions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds, or otherwise) affecting air transportation and in force on the effective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or any modification or cancellation thereof, between such air carrier and any other air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier for pool-

ing or apportioning earnings, losses, traffic, service, or equipment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates, fares, charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety, economy, and efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops, schedules, and character of service, or for other cooperative working arrangements.

"(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter, and shall by order approve any such contract or agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this chapter; except that the Board may not approve any contract or agreement between an air carrier not directly engaged in the operation of aircraft in air transportation and a common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, governing the compensation to be received by such common carrier for transportation services performed by it. Pub. L. 85-726, Title IV, §412, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 770."

Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. §1384) reads as follows:

"Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378, 1379, or 1382 [Federal Aviation Act §412] of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws', as desingated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order. Pub. L. 85-726, Title IV, §414, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 770."

Statement of the Case

This case comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which reversed an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute, a civil action for treble damages under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act.

Respondent and Allied Air Freight, Inc.* were air freight forwarders in the New York-Puerto Rico market, and therefore were "air carriers" by the terms of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The service of an air freight forwarder is to receive goods destined for air carriage from the consignor and deliver them to the air carrier; then, upon their arrival at the airport of destination, to receive the goods from the air carrier and deliver them to the consignee. An air freight forwarder derives some profit from handling charges, local cartage, and other similar fees. However, the principal part of an air freight forwarder's revenues is derived from the differential between the rate he is authorized to charge a shipper for a characteristically small air freight shipment and the lesser rate he pays the airline carrier for the larger shipments into which he consolidates a number of small shipments.

Respondent's complaint (pars. 22-29) alleged an "agreement" in the form of a conspiracy in restraint of trade be-

* Allied Air Freight, Inc. did not appeal to the Court of Appeals nor is it a respondent here. Therefore, all references to the proceedings in the trial court will deal only with Respondent.

tween Petitioner, an air carrier, and Add Airfreight Corp. ("Add"), another air freight forwarder, to secure for Add a monopoly position in the air freight forwarding business between New York and Puerto Rico and to secure for Petitioner a monopoly of air freight carriage in that market. In furtherance of this agreement, it is claimed that Petitioner embargoed and backlogged goods being forwarded by Respondent both on planes going from New York to Puerto Rico and from Puerto Rico to New York. Moreover, Petitioner, in conjunction with Add, is supposed to have solicited Respondent's customers for Add, promising quicker service. This alleged conspiracy is said to have ended when Add "turned on its co-conspirator" and entered into an arrangement with a competing airline.

Soon after the complaint was filed in January, 1964, the District Court stayed all proceedings until Respondent exhausted its available remedies before the CAB. The stay was granted upon motion of Petitioner that primary jurisdiction over the allegations in the complaint had been vested by Congress in the CAB by virtue of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. The District Court reaffirmed this conclusion on reargument, and Respondent appealed to and also sought a writ of madamus from the Court of Appeals. That Court dismissed the appeal as having been improperly taken from an interlocutory order and denied the application for mandamus. 340 F.2d 160 (1965). This Court then denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. 381 U. S. 924 (1965).

Thereafter, Respondent took no steps to submit the matter to the Civil Aeronautics Board during the period of

time from the issuance of the stay order in 1964 until June, 1967, at which time the case was called on the Review Calendar of the District Court. Upon the review of the calendar, the District Judge ordered that the case should be dismissed without prejudice unless within 90 days the Respondent took action to obtain a determination of the suit. The Respondent failed to take such action and the case was therefore dismissed.

After Respondent's action was dismissed by the District Court in September, 1966 for failure to proceed, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals which reversed the dismissal, vacated the stay and remanded the case to the District Court. It is this action by the Court of Appeals which Petitioner seeks review of here.

The gist of the Court of Appeals' decision (Lumbard, Ch. J.) is that primary jurisdiction does not lie with the CAB when a complaint alleges that an unfiled agreement that violates the anti-trust laws has terminated, and merely damages, rather than an injunction, is sought by way of relief. Resort to the CAB in such a case would be a "futile gesture," according to the Court, since the CAB cannot grant damages and future conduct of the parties is not involved. Although the Court recognized that an allegation of an agreement between air carriers which was still in effect would require cession of primary jurisdiction to the CAB for determination as to whether the agreement should be immunized from the operation of the anti-trust laws, it assumed *sub silentio* that the CAB could not immunize an agreement that had allegedly been terminated prior to the bringing of the action, and ruled therefore

that primary jurisdiction was not in the CAB. The Court erred in assuming that the CAB lacked the power retroactively to give anti-trust immunity to an agreement no longer in effect between air carriers.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

I. The decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with this Court's decision in *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference*, 383 U. S. 213 (1966) because the alleged agreement was "arguably lawful" as the CAB had power to approve it retroactively and thereby immunize it from the anti-trust laws.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with this Court's decision in *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference*, 383 U. S. 213 (1966). As such, it should not be allowed to stand unreviewed, for it contravenes the policy of ceding primary jurisdiction to the body best able to deal with a question initially and will precipitate inconsistent regulation of parties similarly situated.

Carnation involved allegations of anti-trust violations arising from implementation of rate-maintenance agreements that had not been filed with the Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC"). This Court held that Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §814, precludes retroactive validation by the FMC of an unapproved rate-maintenance agreement and, therefore, that a court did not have to cede primary jurisdiction over the clearly unlawful agreement to the FMC as that body could not perform any useful function in relation thereto. However, because the re-

spondents in *Carnation* contended that the agreement had been impliedly approved by the FMC in an earlier proceeding, this Court held that a stay and reference to the FMC was proper, as respondents' conduct was "arguably lawful" under the Shipping Act and, if the FMC found it had approved the agreement, immune from the anti-trust laws.

The Court of Appeals misconstrued this "arguably lawful" criterion when it held that the instant case was not within the CAB's primary jurisdiction. For the Court assumed that an unfiled alleged agreement, the operation of which has terminated, could not be retroactively approved by the CAB under Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1382 and hence concluded that resort to the CAB would be a "futile gesture" which would serve no useful purpose. The Court failed to note the clear difference between the wording of Section 412 of the Aviation Act and that wording of Section 15 of the Shipping Act that was critical to the decision in *Carnation*. Section 15 of the Shipping Act reads, in part, as follows:

> "The Board may by order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations.
>
> • • •
>
> All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made after the organization of the Board shall be law-

ful only when and as long as approved by the Board, and *before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation.*

Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section shall be excepted from the provisions of sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto." (Emphasis supplied.)

This language was held by this Court to preclude retroactive validation of an agreement by the FMC. In contrast, Section 412 of the Aviation Act, quoted at pp. 2-3, *supra*, contains no language that explicitly makes it unlawful to carry out an unfiled agreement. Thus, the CAB could retroactively validate an agreement that had not previously been filed and could thereby confer upon the parties immunity from the anti-trust laws pursuant to Section 414 of the Aviation Act, quoted at p. 3, *supra*. Whether the CAB will take cognizance of and validate an agreement that is no longer in effect is for the agency to decide; it clearly has statutory power to do so, and therefore the administrative proceeding would not be a "futile gesture," as the Court of Appeals suggested. P. 8A, *infra*. The CAB should, therefore, have primary jurisdiction. See *Carter* v. *American Telephone & Telegraph Co.*, 365 F.2d 486, 499 (5th Cir. 1966), *cert. denied*, 385 U. S. 1008 (1967).

Further, the existence of a question as to whether the CAB will immunize the alleged terminated agreement indicates that the practices under the agreement complained of by Respondent are "arguably lawful". The Second Circuit assumed, without discussion and erroneously, that

the CAB could not retroactively validate an agreement of the kind here alleged. This error should not stand unreviewed.

In addition, the instant decision is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's decision in *Maddock & Miller, Inc.* v. *United States Lines,* 365 F.2d 98 (1966), which followed and drew heavily upon *Carnation.* The case involved three claims, two of which were clearly outside the agency's jurisdiction and the third of which was clearly within the agency's jurisdiction but only tangentially related to the other two. Nonetheless, the Court properly referred all claims to the agency due to its "extensive experience in dealing with the industry." In the instant case, the CAB's expertise with respect to the operation of the air carriage industry, its economics and the practices and modes of carrying on its business support the conclusion that that body should first determine the propriety of the claimed agreement between Petitioner and Add and such related questions as whether Respondent's insolvency resulted from such an agreement or from other aspects of its position in the New York-Puerto Rico air transportation market.

II. To make primary jurisdiction of the CAB depend on a plaintiff's election to request relief only for past acts would disrupt the orderly administration of the regulatory scheme.

The decision by the Second Circuit unduly narrows the field of primary jurisdiction, thereby raising very significant possible effects. Under Section 412 of the Aviation Act, any "contract or agreement" between air carriers

must be filed with the CAB, which then approves or disapproves it depending upon the "public interest." Merely by alleging that the agreement no longer is in effect, however, a plaintiff can, under the Second Circuit test, evade the primary jurisdiction of the CAB. Such jurisdiction could be evaded whether or not the agreement is still in effect, as the critical question to the Second Circuit is whether only past harm is complained of. This is highlighted by footnote 3 to the Court's opinion, p. 9A, *infra,* which deals with Respondent's attempt to amend its complaint to delete allegations that contained an element of currency. Certainly this presents the likelihood of inconsistent regulation of the practices and dealings of air carriers, depending upon whether a plaintiff complains merely of past injury or also of current harm. For it is entirely conceivable that the CAB would approve, as in the public interest, an agreement between air carriers which, if the plaintiff requested only damages for past harm, might be the basis for a judgment for treble damages in the district court. This is out of step with the theory of *Carnation* and might precipitate grossly inconsistent regulation of competing air carriers whose practices are identical.

Conclusion

This Court is presented with an important question of the proper limits of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that will have great impact upon the scheme of regulation of air carriers and the administration of the antitrust laws. The decision below overly narrows the jurisdiction of the administrative agency, and thereby threat-

ens the integrity of the regulatory scheme. This Court should, therefore, review this decision.

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Dated: July 23, 1968.

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 126—September Term, 1967.

(Argued November 24, 1967 Decided April 25, 1968.)

Docket No. 31043

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT, INC.,

Plaintiff,

—and—

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

against

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before:

LUMBARD, *Chief Judge,*
KAUFMAN and FEINBERG, *Circuit Judges.*

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Sidney Sugarman, *Ch. J.*, dismissing civil action for treble damages under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, without prejudice, for lack of prosecution, pursuant to the terms of a 90-day order issued

by John F. X. McGohey, *J.*, and a stay issued by Edmund L. Palmieri, *J.*

Reversed and Remanded.

MILTON HOROWITZ, New York, N. Y., *for plaintiff-appellant.*

FOWLER HAMILTON, New York, N. Y. (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, N. Y. and George Weisz, New York, N. Y., on the brief), *for defendant-appellee.*

LUMBARD, *Chief Judge*:

The question which appellant seeks to raise is whether or not the district court erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to plaintiffs' civil antitrust suit and staying the action until plaintiffs exhausted available administrative remedies before the Civil Aeronautics Board. Before reaching this question, we must clear away considerable procedural underbrush, the net result being that, in the interests of efficient judicial administration, we conclude that we should review the interlocutory stay order on this appeal from a final order dismissing the action without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Since appellant only seeks damages for past actions by appellee which are not "arguably lawful" under the administrative scheme, the stay is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings in the district court.

Allied Air Freight, Inc. and Allied Air Freight International Corp.,[1] were engaged in the business of air freight

1. Throughout the proceedings plaintiffs have been referred to collectively as "Allied." They had common ownership, officers, administration and operations. Only Allied Air Freight International Corp. has appealed.

forwarding. Defendant Pan American is an air carrier which, *inter alia*, operates an air freight service between New York and Puerto Rico. The complaint claims that Pan American entered into a conspiracy in restraint of trade with Add Airfreight Corp., an air freight forwarding company, for the purpose of securing for Add a monopoly in the air freight forwarding business between New York and Puerto Rico.

Allied charges that in furtherance of this conspiracy Pan American denied airplane space to shipments consolidated by plaintiffs and gave undue preference to shipments consolidated by Add. Allegedly this practice ceased only after "informal intervention" by Civil Aeronautics Board personnel in response to Allied's complaint. In addition, it was alleged that Pan American and Add solicited Allied's customers in Puerto Rico and that Pan American, in an attempt to take away Allied's business, warned shippers that freight handled by Allied "would not move," while Add shipments would move "with top priority."

The conspiracy allegedly ended when Add entered into an arrangement with one of Pan American's competitors. After that, Pan American allegedly continued to attempt to destroy Allied's business by impairing its credit.

Pan American moved to dismiss or stay the action on March 10, 1964 on the ground that primary jurisdiction of the matter was vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. On May 22, 1964, Judge Palmieri granted a stay "until the plaintiff exhausts its available remedies before the Civil Aeronautics Board."

On June 2, 1964, Allied's request for a certificate for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) was denied by Judge Palmieri. Nonetheless plaintiffs filed a

notice of appeal. On June 19 Allied moved for reargument before Judge Palmieri. After reargument the court filed an opinion adhering to its decision. We dismissed plaintiffs' appeal in January 1965 for lack of jurisdiction and a petition for mandamus was denied as an inappropriate attempt to obtain review of an unappealable order. *Allied Air Freight, Inc.* v. *Pan American World Airways, Inc.*, 340 F. 2d 160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 924 (1965).

On June 8, 1966, the action appeared on the Review Calendar of the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 of the Southern District. Judge McGohey issued an order from the bench providing that unless Allied filed a note of issue for trial, took other action to obtain a determination of the action or sought an extension of time within 90 days the action would be dismissed for want of prosecution. Thereafter, Judge Sugarman, *sua sponte*, signed an order on September 26, 1966, dismissing the action without prejudice.

Allied Air Freight, Inc. was adjudicated bankrupt in July 1964 by the United States District Court for New Jersey, and has not appealed. The bankrupt estate was closed and assets were distributed soon after issuance of the 90-day order of Judge McGohey. Pan American offered to stipulate for a vacatur of the dismissal order and restoration of the cause to the status quo ante as a pending action stayed by the order of June 1, 1964 on the condition that the appeal be withdrawn if the application for restoration were granted. Allied declined this offer, stating that it desired to obtain review of the stay order on its merits.

Pan American does not challenge the Court's jurisdiction to hear any aspect of the appeal. Indeed the parties are agreed that appellant is entitled to some relief. The points upon which they differ are the nature of the relief

to be granted and the extent to which the Court should review the proceedings below at this time.

Pan American's theory is that since it was in Allied's power to avoid the final order from which this appeal was taken, and since Allied does not deny that the reason that no action was taken to avoid dismissal under the 90-day order was to obtain review of the interlocutory order granting the stay, which appellant had failed to obtain by direct appeal from the order or by mandamus, we should decline to rule on the stay order "in the interest of the orderly administration of justice." We are warned that to consider the merits of this interlocutory order in this case would encourage all would-be appellants from interlocutory orders to do nothing, procure a dismissal, which under the present practice in the Southern District is likely to be without prejudice,[2] which could then be appealed to this Court for review of the interlocutory order.

Even though appellant could have averted dismissal of the action by seeking an extension during the 90-day period or applying to the CAB in order to exhaust administrative remedies, the dismissal is not a voluntary dismissal from which there is no appeal. *United States* v. *Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.*, 356 U. S. 677 (1958); *Ruff* v. *Gay*, 67 F. 2d 684 (5th Cir. 1933), aff'd, 292 U. S. 25 (1934).

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2. It may be a better practice for the district court routinely to order that dismissals for failure to prosecute be with prejudice, unless plaintiff makes a showing to the calendar judge that the dismissal should be without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). *Link* v. *Wabash Railroad Co.*, 370 U. S. 626, 629-633 (1962). *West* v. *Gilbert*, 361 F. 2d 314 (2d Cir. 1966). Under Rule 33 of the Southern District, plaintiff has at least 15 days to prepare to make a showing that the case ought not to be dismissed, or ought not to be dismissed with prejudice. Even if plaintiff fails to make the showing, dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute may be remedied in appropriate cases through resort to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). *Link* v. *Wabash Railroad Co., supra.*

Appellee seeks to distinguish these cases because the appeals were from dismissals on the merits, while this appeal is from a dismissal without prejudice. We do not believe that this distinction should control: dismissals with and without prejudice are equally appealable as final orders. *United States* v. *Wallace & Tiernan Co.*, 336 U. S. 793, 794 (1949); *Noonan* v. *Cunard Steamship Co.*, 375 F. 2d 69 (2d Cir. 1967). Whether or not to dismiss on the merits is within the discretion of the district court. *Link* v. *Wabash Railroad Co.*, 370 U. S. 626, 633 (1962). The nature of relief granted at the trial court's discretion does not determine whether or not a final order is appealable, although it may be a determining factor in the disposition of the appeal. Since all interlocutory orders and decrees are merged into the final order of the district court, see 6 Moore, Federal Practice, pars. 54.12[1], 54.09 (2d ed. 1966), they may be reviewed on the appeal. *Davenport* v. *Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.*, 241 F. 2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1957).

Pan American contends that even though the court may review the stay order as well as the dismissal order, we should merely vacate the dismissal order and restore matters to where they were before Judge McGohey issued the 90-day order. Pan American urges that Judge Sugarman, acting upon Judge McGohey's order of June 8, 1966, could not have known of the stay issued by Judge Palmieri, and that if the court below had known of the stay, the dismissal order would not have issued.

We do not find this argument convincing. The 90-day order permitted appellant to "take other action to obtain a determination of the above entitled action . . . ." or apply for an extension prior to the expiration of the 90 days,

supported by an affidavit showing "the reason why additional time is needed" in lieu of filing a note of issue. Because of the stay order, appellant was precluded from proceeding with the action in the district court "until plaintiffs exhaust their available remedies before the Civil Aeronautics Board." However, Allied could have complied with both the 90-day order and the stay by commencing a proceeding before the CAB and informing the court that it was proceeding to exhaust administrative remedies.

Allied contends that Judge McGohey was informed at oral argument on the calendar call that the case had been stayed pending exhaustion of administrative remedies, and Pan American does not dispute this contention. But whether or not the calendar judge knew that an order had been issued making exhaustion of administrative remedies a condition precedent to prosecution of the action in the district court, an order dismissing the action unless plaintiffs filed an affidavit showing reasons why a note of issue could not be filed within 90 days certainly is not an abuse of the district court's discretion in dealing with an action which had been dormant for over two years. If the order granting the stay was a proper order, it was equally proper to require appellant to satisfy the terms of the stay in order to proceed with the action or face dismissal for failure to prosecute, and to dismiss the action *sua sponte* when appellant failed to take any action.

The only possibility of error that we see in the issuance of the 90-day order and the dismissal under its terms was that requiring exhaustion of available administrative remedies as a condition precedent to further action in the district court, in accordance with the terms of the stay, was an erroneous application of the doctrine of primary jurisdic-

tion which imposed an undue burden upon Allied. Therefore we consider the merits of appellant's argument that the district court erred in issuing the interlocutory stay order.

We find that since plaintiffs only seek the remedy of damages, which the administrative agency is not empowered to give, and since determination of the issues in this action by the court will have no effect on the future conduct of the parties and will not impinge upon the agency's ability to promote a uniform scheme of regulation by approving or disapproving of similar agreements in the future, it was inappropriate and not in the interests of efficient administration of justice to compel plaintiffs to make the futile gesture of undertaking administrative proceedings.

All parties to this action concededly are "air carriers" within the terms of Section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. §1301(3), subject to the comprehensive scheme for regulation of the air transport industry embodied in the Federal Aviation Act, and administered by the CAB in accordance with the policies set forth in §102 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §1302. The parties agree that §412 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §1382, requires filing with the Board of every agreement or contract affecting air transportation, including oral argeements. *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association,* 107 F. Supp. 706, 710 (SDNY 1952); *Trans Continental & Western Air, Inc.—Delta Airlines, Inc., Interchange of Equipment,* 8 CAB 857 (1947). It is clear that an order of the Board approving an agreement submitted to it under §412 will exempt any persons affected by the Board's order from liability under the antitrust laws insofar as may be necessary to comply with the order. §414, 49

U. S. C. §1384. *McManus* v. *Lake Central Airlines, Inc.*, 327 F. 2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 943 (1964). It is also clear that the Board may, on its own motion or on the complaint of an air carrier, investigate whether any air carrier "is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation. . . ." and it is empowered to order an air carrier to cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition. §411, 49 U. S. C. §1381.

Pan American contends that this pattern of regulation requires that initial determination of the propriety of the alleged agreement be made by the Board, citing *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States*, 371 U. S. 296 (1963); *S. S. W., Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association*, 191 F. 2d 658 (D. C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 955 (1952) and *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transportation Association, supra.* Allied concedes that if the complaint did not allege that the agreement had terminated,[3] the Board would have primary jurisdiction and no antitrust suit could proceed until the Board issued an order approving or disapproving the agreement.

However, Allied contends, and we agree, that this case is distinguishable from those where the doctrine of primary

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3. While paragraphs 30 *et seq.* of plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendant had continued a course of conduct calculated to destroy plaintiffs' credit up to the moment of filing of the complaint, on motion for rehearing before Judge Palmieri plaintiffs announced that they would amend their complaint to delete these paragraphs and limit themselves to causes of action based upon the agreement between Pan American and Add Airfreight which allegedly had terminated. Plaintiffs may amend the complaint without leave pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we assume that Allied will so amend its complaint and that the amended complaint will relate exclusively to transactions and occurrences which terminated prior to the time that the complaint was filed.

jurisdiction has been applied to antitrust actions brought against air carriers because plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief and it is conceded that the alleged agreement is no longer in effect.

In *S. S. W., Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association, supra,* plaintiff alleged that an association of scheduled air carriers conspired against nonscheduled airlines in violation of the antitrust laws. Plaintiff sought both an injunction and treble damages. The court found that the Civil Aeronautics Act (predecessor to the Federal Aviation Act) superseded the antitrust laws in the regulated industry only to the extent that the regulatory scheme was repugnant to the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, following the reasoning of *United States Navigation Co.* v. *Cunard SS Co.,* 284 U. S. 474 (1932), the court stayed the action pending approval or disapproval of the alleged agreement, even though it had never been filed with the Board. 191 F. 2d at 662-663.

In *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transportation Association, supra,* plaintiff charged that the scheduled airlines conspired to restrain sales of tickets by plaintiff for non-scheduled airlines by boycotting it. It sought both an injunction and damages. The district court followed the *S. S. W.* case and stayed the action pending an administrative determination of the validity of the agreement under the Civil Aeronautics Act, although the alleged agreement had never been filed with the Board. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in the *Cunard* case and *Far East Conference* v. *United States,* 342 U. S. 570 (1952), which it believed gave the Board primary jurisdiction even if the agreement was unlawful on its face.

On the authority of *Cunard* and *Far East* the courts have been justifiably reluctant to grant injunctive relief and

damages against air carriers who were subject to a scheme of regulation of shipping. However, the Supreme Court's decision in *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference*, 383 U. S. 213 (1966), has made it clear that the reasoning of *Cunard* and *Far East* does not apply when plaintiff only seeks damages for injuries caused by an agreement that is not "arguably lawful" under the administrative exemption from the antitrust laws.

The *Cunard* case was an appeal from dismissal of an antitrust suit seeking to enjoin practices of a shipping conference allegedly designed to force shippers to deal exclusively with the defendants and refrain from shipping by vessels of plaintiff. The district court had held that the matters complained of were within the exclusive jurisdiction of Shipping Board. In affirming Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote:

> "A comparison of the enumeration of wrongs charged in the bill with the provisions of the sections of the Shipping Act above outlined conclusively shows, without going into detail, that the allegations either constitute direct and basic charges of violations of these provisions or are so interrelated with such charges as to be in effect a component part of them; and the remedy is that afforded by the Shipping Act, which to that extent supersedes the antitrust laws. Compare Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. [260 U. S. 156], 162. The matter, therefore, is within the exclusive preliminary jurisdiction of the Shipping Board." 284 U. S. at 485.

In *Far East*, the Supreme Court extended the same doctrine to a case where the Government sought the antitrust remedy of injunction. "We see no reason to depart from United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co.,

284 U. S. 474. That case answers our problem." 342 U. S. at 573. However, in *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference,* 383 U. S. 213 (1966) the Court stated that the doctrine of *Cunard* and *Far East* does not apply when plaintiff only seeks treble damages for past and completed conduct not arguably lawful under the administrative scheme:

> "The award of treble damages for past and completed conduct which clearly violated the Shipping Act would certainly not interfere with any future action of the Commission. Although the Commission can approve prospective operations under agreements which have been implemented without approval, respondents concede that the Commission has no power to validate pre-approval implementation of such agreements. Therefore, the Far East and Cunard principles only preclude courts from awarding treble damages when the defendants' conduct is arguably lawful under the Shipping Act." 383 U. S. at 222.

In *Carnation,* plaintiff sought treble damages only. It alleged that rate increases charged by members of the conference were not approved by the Commission and therefore were not exempt from the antitrust laws. The *Far East* and *Cunard* cases were distinguished because the relief that had been sought was injunctive and would have interfered with the Commission's power under the regulatory scheme of the Shipping Act to grant future immunity from antitrust sanctions by approving an agreement. The antitrust action in *Carnation* was stayed because the Court found that defendants' conduct was arguably lawful, since they contended that the Commission had approved their rate increase by implication. 383 U. S. at 220. Therefore the

Commission had to determine whether or not it had approved the agreement.

The case before us is in all respects analogous to the *Carnation* case except that the alleged agreement concededly has not been passed upon by the CAB. Without CAB approval actions pursuant to an agreement are not immune from the antitrust laws. *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference,* 383 U. S. at 216-218; *United States* v. *Borden Co.,* 308 U. S. 188, 201 (1939); *S. S. W. Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association of America,* 191 F. 2d at 665 (Judge Clark concurring). Accord, *River Plate & Brazil Conferences* v. *Pressed Steel Car Co.,* 227 F. 2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1955). Since defendant's conduct is not arguably lawful under the Federal Aviation Act and plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief, we see no reason why the antitrust action should not proceed. See *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference,* 383 U. S. at 226, *Maritime Board* v. *Isbrandtsen,* 356 U. S. 481, 519 (1958) (Frankfurter, *J.,* dissenting); *Slick Airways Inc.* v. *American Airlines, Inc.,* 107 F. Supp. 199 (D. N. J. 1952), on rehearing, 107 F. Supp. 216-217, appeal dismissed sub nom. *American Airlines, Inc.* v. *Forman,* 204 F. 2d 230 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 806 (1953).

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. *United States,* 371 U. S. 296 (1963) does not compel any different result. In that civil antitrust action by the government to obtain injunctive relief, the court held that the CAB could give full relief under its §411 power to issue cease and desist orders or approve the status quo and immunize defendants under §412 from an injunction under the antitrust laws. The Court did not see how the antitrust issues could be decided without passing upon division of territories,

allocation of routes, and affiliation between common carriers and air carriers which, under the regulatory scheme of the Aviation Act, are all questions peculiarly for Board decision. However the Court was careful not to foreclose the possibility that antitrust actions could be brought without prior resort to the Board. 371 U. S. at 304-305, 312. See *Trans World Airlines Inc.* v. *Hughes,* 332 F. 2d 602, 609 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 380 U. S. 248 (1965).

In this case the Board is unable to give the relief which appellant seeks. It has no power to award damages for unfair competitive practices. *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association,* 107 F. Supp. at 711; *Slick Airways, Inc.* v. *American Airlines, Inc.,* 107 F. Supp. at 211 (D. N. J. 1952). In deciding whether or not an alleged unfiled agreement no longer in force violated the antitrust laws, the district court would not be interfering with the Board's power to immunize this or similar agreements in the future under the criteria of §102 of the Federal Aviation Act, or to issue a cease and desist order under §411, as the relief asked would not have prospective applicability. This is not a case where the past is a prologue to present problems. See *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States,* 371 U. S. at 310. The allegations of the complaint relate to actions that have been completed. Here one plaintiff is bankrupt, the other insolvent and neither is in operation.

Our decision in *Maddock & Miller, Inc.* v. *United States Lines,* 365 F. 2d 98 (2d Cir. 1966) does not require a different result. That case involved a complaint that asserted three independent causes of action. The third count alleged that United States Lines had received an illegal rebate in violation of the Shipping Act. Although we

found that decision of the two antitrust counts by the district court would not seem to interfere with the Commission's exercise of its powers, the action was nonetheless stayed to permit the Commission to consider in the first instance whether or not the agreement in question constituted a rebate, in order to take advantage of the Commission's special ability to handle this factual issue, common to all counts.

In this case two causes of action are pleaded. The first relates to violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The second is a tort action for single damages arising out of alleged violations of §404 of the Federal Aviation Act by appellee's discriminating against appellant. In *Fitzgerald* v. *Pan American World Airways,* 229 F. 2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) we held that the Board does not have primary jurisdiction over damage actions for past discrimination in violation of §404. There is no cause of action under the Federal Aviation Act which must be referred to the Board for determination.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is invoked by the courts in order to achieve uniformity of result, and obtain the benefits of administrative expertise. *Far East Conference* v. *United States,* 342 U. S. at 574-575; *Terminal Warehouse Co.* v. *Pennsylvania Railroad,* 297 U. S. 500, 513 (1936); *Texas & Pacific Railway* v. *Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,* 204 U. S. 426 (1907). As Judge Clark said in *C. A. B.* v. *Modern Air Transport,* 179 F. 2d 622, "[T]he outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly said to be its flexibility permitting the courts to make a workable allocation of business between themselves and the agencies." 179 F. 2d at 625. In this case there is no need to seek uniformity, and the Board has no special abilities which it

could bring to bear on the problems which must be resolved in deciding appellant's claim on its merits. See *Trans World Airlines, Inc.* v. *Hughes*, 332 F. 2d at 609; *Slick Airways, Inc.* v. *American Airlines Inc.*, 107 F. Supp. at 212 on rehearing, 107 F. Supp. at 216-217.

The dismissal is reversed, the stay is vacated and the action is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Staying the Action

and

Opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Refusing to Vacate the Stay on Reargument

UNITED STATES DISTRIC COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT, INC. and ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP., *Plaintiffs,* *against* PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, *Defendant.*	64 Civil 86

PALMIERI, J.

The defendant moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., for a dismissal of this action brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, or, in the alternative, for a stay, on the ground that primary jurisdiction is vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), *S.S.W., Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association of America,* (D.C. Cir. 1951), 191 F.2d 685, *cert. denied,* 343 U. S. 955 (1952); *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association,* 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States,* 371 U. S. 296 (1963);[1] *contra, Slick Airways, Inc.* v. *American Airlines, Inc.,* 107 F. Supp. 199 (D. N.J. 1951), *appeal dismissed,* 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1953), *cert. denied,* 346 U. S. 806.

1. See discussion of this decision in 77 Harv. L. Rev. 163 (1963); 63 Colum. L. Rev. 923 (1963).

Plaintiff Allied Air Freight, Inc. (Allied)[2] is a bulk shipper of air freight. It makes its profit by collecting small amounts from individual shippers, consolidating them into one large shipment, and retaining as profit the difference between the rates it charges to shippers and the lower, bulk shipment rates which it pays to the carrier airline. The complaint alleges that from August 10, 1962 to the spring of 1963, Pan American World Airways (Pan American) conspired with Add Airfreight (Add), a competitor of plaintiff, to monopolize the air freight business between New York and Puerto Rico to the serious detriment of plaintiff. It further alleges that the conspiracy between Pan American and Add terminated only when Add transferred its business from Pan American to a competing carrier. And now, after the conspiracy has ended, it is alleged by Allied that Pan American continues to seek its destruction by attempting to destroy its credit.

Allied seeks to recover judgment from Pan American in the amount of $3,000,000—three times the damages which it claims it suffered by reason of Pan American's allegedly unlawful acts.

Essentially, the issue is whether this Court or the CAB has primary jurisdiction over the suit. Where broad powers of regulation and control are conferred upon administrative agencies, this doctrine is applied in order to avoid conflicts and inconsistencies between them and the courts, and in order to insure uniformity of treatment and regulation. Its ultimate aim is thus to make of the courts and the regulating bodies "collaborating instrumentalities of jus-

2. While there are in fact two plaintiffs, they are so closely interrelated and integrated, having common ownership, officers, administration and operation, that they will be referred to throughout this opinion in the singular, or by the collective term "Allied."

tice," the "appropriate independence of each" being "respected by the other,"[3] so that the standards applied by them in the same general field can be concordant.[4]

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has become an important part of the field of federal jurisdication since it was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in *Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.* v. *Abilene Cotton Oil Co.*, 204 U. S. 426 (1907). The doctrine has been extended to practices of railroads under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §1 *et seq.*; *Northern Pacific Ry. Co.* v. *Solum*, 247 U. S. 477 (1918); and to practices of steamship companies under the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §801 *et seq.*; *United States Navigation Co.* v. *Cunard Steamship Co.*, 284 U. S. 474 (1932). It has been applied in both private[5] and Government[6] antitrust suits affecting the air transport industry.

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. §401 *et seq.*, the basic statute governing control of air carriers, as well as its successor statute, the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1301 *et seq.*, conferred upon the CAB broad powers and duties for both promoting and regulating air transportation. Congress has prescribed that the exercise of these functions should be carried out in pursuit of multiple objectives—safety in air transportation, sound economic conditions in the industry, its proper adaptation to

3. The quoted language is borrowed from the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in *United States* v. *Morgan*, 313 U. S. 409, 422 (1941).

4. See Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 923 (1963), which discusses the primary jurisdiction doctrine in its relation to the CAB, as well as the decision in *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States*, 371 U. S. 296 (1963).

5. *S.S.W., Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association of America, supra; Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association, supra.*

6. *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States, supra.*

the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense, Federal Aviation Act §102(d), 49 U.S.C. §1302(d); Caves, Air Transport and its Regulators, Chapter 6, (Harvard University Press, 1962). Competition is to be employed "to the extent necessary." These powers were granted pursuant to a policy which declared uniform control of this industry to be in the public interest and which further declared that unrestrained competition in this industry was not consonant with its efficient development.[7] Almost as a necessary corollary to the implementation of this policy, Congress extended to the CAB the power to immunize industry practices from the effects of the antitrust laws when such immunization would benefit the public and the industry. Federal Aviation Act §414; 49 U.S.C. §1384.

Against this impressive background of power and regulation, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is readily applicable. The issues raised by the complaint appear on their face to fall within the jurisdiction of the CAB. The alleged agreement between Pan American and Add for the purpose of securing a monopoly of air freight carriage between New York and Puerto Rico is one subject to Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act. (49 U.S.C. §1382) which gives the CAB full authority to approve or disapprove of any agreements between air carriers[8] in accord-

7. It was said in S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., page 2, "competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme, which tends to jeopardize the financial status of air carriers and to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the public interest. . . ."

8. It has long been settled that freight forwarders are air carriers. "There is no dispute that an air freight forwarder is an air carrier." *National Air Freight Forward. Corp.* v. *CAB*, 197 F.2d

ance with the standards of the Federal Aviation Act. Moreover, the allegations of destructive and harassing tactics by defendant could have been the subject matter of a complaint before the CAB under Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1381), which gives it broad plenary powers of investigation into "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition," charging it with the obligation to order any air carrier engaged in such practices or methods of competition to "cease and desist" therefrom.[9]

The plaintiff does not deny the force of these applicable regulatory statutes but it seeks to avoid their impact here. Plaintiff's contentions can be summarized as follows: (1) that the action is for money damages which the CAB is powerless to give; (2) that the alleged agreement of Pan American and Add and the actions taken pursuant to it were terminated in 1963 and that any reference to the CAB would be futile; and (3) that there can be no conflict here between the Court and the regulatory agency since the latter can only deal with current matters with respect to which it has a prospective remedial function to exercise, and that no such frame of reference exists here.

None of these arguments is persuasive. The inability of the CAB to award money damages was expressly considered in the *Apgar* and *S.S.W.* cases, *supra*, as a basis for withholding recognition of the primary jurisdiction

384, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also *Railway Express Agency, Grandfather Certificate*, 1941, 2 C.A.B. 531; *Universal Air Freight Corp., Investigation*, 1942, 3 C.A.B. 698; 49 U.S.C. §1301(3).

9. In this connection it is of interest to note Paragraph 26 of the Complaint which states: "Only the informal intervention of personnel of said Civil Aeronautics Board, at the urgent request therefor by Allied, broke the embargo and led to more equitable carriage by defendant of Allied's freight."

doctrine, and was rejected. In both cases, referral to the agency was made, not for remedial purposes, but to insure uniformity of regulation where specialized experience and expert competence were necessary because of the presence of problems affecting the industry. *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association,* 107 F. Supp. 706, 711 at n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The priority of jurisdiction by the administrative agency is conditioned "not upon the ability of the administrative agency to grant a remedy, but upon the presence of problems calling for the kind of consideration which only the administrative agency is in a position to give." *Id.* at 711.

The plaintiff further contends that since most of the allegations of the complaint deal with matters which have now been terminated, referral to the CAB would be improper and unnecessary; and that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction can, at best, apply only to the destruction of credit allegations which are of a continuing nature and which are severable from the rest of the complaint. *Compare McCleneghan* v. *Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha,* 298 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1962).

This contention must be rejected for several reasons. At the outset, any attempt to parcel out or divide responsibilities between the CAB and the courts would be cumbersome and difficult to accomplish. Instead of furthering the harmonious development of the law in this sensitive area, such a policy would frustrate it and jeopardize the integrity of the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress. Moreover, primacy of jurisdiction in the context of this case means that the CAB has the prior, but not the exclusive right to deal with the matter. Initial scrutiny and decision by the CAB will insure the application of the agency's expertise

to whatever extent the facts require. The issues will thereby be sharpened and clarified to the advantage of the litigants, and of the Court as well, if any judicial responsibilities remain.[10] Simultaneous efforts by both the Court and the CAB in the same litigation, as the plaintiff here suggests, would invite confusion and increase the risk of disparate and discordant results.

The significance of the termination of the alleged illegal agreement between Pan American and Add, as well as most of the activities imputed to the defendant, presents a more troublesome question but leaves the result unchanged. The administrative policy of the CAB in dealing with expired agreements under its Section 412[11] powers, if there were such a policy, would be of interest in this connection. But this Court has been unable to discover any instance in which the CAB exercised its powers under Section 412 with respect to contracts, agreements or understandings already terminated. Whether this is purely fortuitous or represents a policy evolved *sub silentio* is not apparent. In any event, the allegations of continuing harassment of plaintiff through the alleged destruction of credit provide a clear basis for invoking the Section 411[12] powers of the CAB. It would seem unavoidable that all the related issues between the parties would in such case come under the Board's scrutiny. Even if this were not to occur, it is not clear that

---

10. The Board's decisions under Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1381), which deals with unfair or deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition, are subject to judicial review. *American Airlines, Inc.* v. *North American Airlines, Inc.*, 351 U. S. 79, 85 (1956).

11. Section 412 Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1382).

12. Section 411 Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1381).

the CAB would decline to rule under Section 412(b)[13] that a contract or agreement was "adverse to the public interest," or in violation of the Federal Aviation Act, solely because it had already terminated. To borrow an expression from the Court's opinion in *Pan American World Airways* v. *United States, supra* at p. 310, "the past is prologue," and the Board, upon being confronted with matters that have already run their course, might well exploit the occasion for future guidance in the industry. In sum, until the Board has the opportunity to rule, it is wiser for this Court to withhold any action.[14]

14. See *Pan American World Airways* v. *United States, supra* at 313, note 19.

It follows, therefore, that this action should be stayed until the plaintiff exhausts its available remedies before the CAB.

Submit order on notice

Dated: New York, N. Y.
May 22, 1964

EDMUND L. PALMIERI

EDMUND L. PALMIERI
U. S. D. J.

13. Section 412(b) Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §1382(b)).

UNITED STATES DISTRIC COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT, INC. and ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP., *Plaintiffs,* *against* PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, *Defendant.*	64 Civil 86

PALMIERI, J.

The plaintiffs move for leave to reargue a motion made by defendant and granted by this Court on June 1, 1964, pursuant to its opinion dated May 22, 1964. This decision, which is now being appealed by plaintiffs, stayed the action of plaintiffs until their remedies before the Civil Aeronautics Board were exhausted. The basis for plaintiffs' present motion is that a recent decision of the Court of Appeals, decided on June 2, 1964, *Trans World Airlines, Inc.* v. *Howard R. Hughes,* Docket Nos. 28405-6, requires a denial of the motion previously granted, or, alternatively, a certificate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for the purpose of seeking leave from the Court of Appeals to take an immediate interlocutory appeal from the decision of this Court. Such a certificate was denied by this Court by its order and memorandum of June 1, 1964.

It should be noted that the recent Court of Appeals decision relied on by plaintiffs was an affirmance of a District

Court decision in *Trans World Airlines, Inc.* v. *Hughes*, 214 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), which was argued to this Court by both sides. The affirmance adopts substantially the reasoning of the lower court. It follows, therefore, that since the elements of the Court of Appeals decision were before this Court on the original argument, the plaintiffs' present motion cannot be considered to rest on new authority. More than this, however, the Court of Appeals decision is based upon a readily distinguishable fact situation. The transactions there involved were between non-competing parties in an area not subject to CAB regulation whereas this case involves alleged illegal practices of competing carriers within the area of CAB regulation and control. In distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in the *Panagra* case,[1] a decision much bruited both in the recent *TWA* case and in the case before this Court, the Court of Appeals had this to say (pp. 2173-74 of slip sheet opinion):

> "... The unlawful division of territories and allocation of routes with which Pan American, Grace and Panagra were accused were therefore directly within the ambit of powers explicitly granted the Board by the Congress. To permit the courts to intrude into this area would have been, as the Court noted, to permit the erection of an independent yet parallel body of law in direct contravention of the regulatory scheme embodied in the Aviation Act.
>
> By contrast, in the instant case TWA's complaint alleges transactions which are unrelated to any specific function of the CAB. The Board is explicitly entrusted with the duty of considering for approval any poten-

1. *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States*, 371 U. S. 296 (1963).

tial acquisition of control over an air carrier by a person engaged in any phase of aeronautics; and to the extent of such approval—but only to that extent—the Act grants immunity from the operation of the antitrust laws. Surely Congress did not contemplate that CAB approval of an acquisition would be tantamount to approval of every transaction which might be entered into by the controlling party.

Since the Court of Appeals denied the existence of any CAB jurisdiction, primary or otherwise, over the transactions complained of in the *TWA* case, whereas the allegations in the Complaint before this Court raise questions clearly within the functions entrusted to the CAB by Congress, there is no valid basis for reaching a result different from the one already expressed in this Court's opinion of May 22, 1964. Nor can the plaintiffs' presently announced intention to delete portions of the Complaint compel a different result in view of all that was said in that opinion, and particularly those portions of the opinion relating to allegedly illegal practices which terminated prior to this action.

The plaintiffs' motion for reargument is granted; in all other respects the plaintiffs' motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, N.Y.
July 15, 1964

EDMUND L. PALMIERI

EDMUND L. PALMIERI
U. S. D. J.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 333

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.,

Petitioner,

—v.—

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP.,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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IN THE

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No. 333

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.,

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—v.—

ALLIED AIR FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL CORP.,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent (hereinafter called "Allied") accepts Petitioner's (hereinafter called "Pan American") reference to the reports of the case below, jurisdictional statement, and citation of statutes involved.

Question Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that it was reversible error for the District Court to stay an air freight forwarder's antitrust action for treble damages, based on past misconduct implementing a contract, combination and conspiracy between an airline operator and another air freight forwarder which was terminated before the institution of the action, in favor of asserted primary jurisdiction in the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB")? Although all of the actors were air carriers within the

meaning of the Federal Aviation Act, neither the filing of the conspiratorial agreement for an immunizing order under §§412 and 414 of the Act nor unfair competitive practice proceedings under §411 of the Act had ever been instituted. The case involves discrimination in carriage by Pan American against Allied in preference of Pan American's co-conspirator, violative of §404(b) of the Act, for which a tort cause of action for single damages, based on the same facts, is also pleaded, but rates and routing practices are not involved.

Statutes Involved

Additionally to the texts of §§412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958; 72 Stat. 770, Title IV, §§412 and 414, quoted by Pan American in pages 2 and 3 of its Petition herein, the texts of §§404(b) and 411 of the same Act read as follows:

72 Stat. 760, Title IV, §404(b); 49 U. S. C. §1374(b):

DISCRIMINATION

Sec. 404(b) No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

72 Stat. 769, Title IV, §411; 49 U. S. C. §1381:

METHODS OF COMPETITION

Sec. 411. The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition.

Statement of the Case

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (*sub nom. Allied Air Freight, Inc.* v. *Pan American World Airways, Inc.*, 393 F. 2d 441; Petition, pp. 1A-16A) gives an accurate capsule statement of the case and its post complaint history. Additionally, because the time elements figure so importantly, the chronology related in the complaint is as follows:

The conspiratorial agreement between Pan American and Add Airfreight Corp. ("Add") to squeeze Allied out of business was formulated during or shortly prior to August, 1962 and implemented by temporally well defined courses of misconduct, viz.,

1) An embargo by Pan American on carriage of Allied's goods in favor of Add's out of San Juan from August 10, 1962 through August 29, 1962 coupled with joint solicitation of Allied's customers by Pan American and Add effectively promising "next day" service if custom were switched to Add and threatening, effectively, that goods would not move if the customer stayed with Allied.

2) Following the embargo, a policy of harassment of Allied in Add's favor by Pan American's backlogging of Allied's freight.

3) Still another Pan American embargo on Allied's shipments, this time from New York during the three days of November 26th through 28th, 1962.

Paragraph 29 of the complaint contains the core allegations upon which the primary jurisdiction issue of this case, filed on January 8, 1964, turns:

> "Thereafter and in the Spring of 1963, said agreement, combination and conspiracy came to an end. Add, now the largest air freight forwarder in the New York-Puerto Rico trade, turned on its co-conspirator, the defendant, and took its business thus acquired to a competing air carrier." [1]

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[1] Paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 of the complaint went on to relate a unilateral course of conduct by Pan American, commencing on December 20, 1963 and continuing down to the commencement of the suit, in attempting to destroy Allied by destroying its credit, i.e., on the pretext of nonpayment of Allied's obligations to Pan American, threatening to and actually denying to Allied the use of Pan American's airway bills and credit facilities and revoking Allied's agency with Pan American.

In the decision of Pan American's motion to stay the action, the district court laid great stress on these allegations as providing a current nexus for CAB's primary jurisdiction attention (Petition, pp. 5B-7B). Allied, in applying for reargument, announced its intention to amend the complaint by deleting the allegations (Petition, p. 9A, footnote 3). On May 10, 1968, respondent so amended the complaint.

Pan American confines the scope of its Petition to seeking review only of the issue of primary jurisdiction. Accordingly, the "procedural underbrush" (Petition, p. 2A) falls away and the only instant concern is whether this Court ought to review a determination reversing as erroneous a district court stay of prosecution of a private antitrust action for damages based on past misconduct under a terminated, concededly unimmunized agreement, in favor of a primary jurisdiction in the CAB asserted for it by Pan American. Supporting its contention that this case merits review, Pan American contends that the holding below is in conflict with *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference,* 383 U. S. 213 (1966) in that it misapplies the "arguably lawful" concept of *Carnation* to a radically differing immunizing statute.

Allied contends that the opinion below (Petition, pp. 1A-16A) is a determination free from error, and represents a narrow exception, hedged in by many qualifying conditions, to a general rule of primary jurisdiction.

Reasons for Denying the Writ

1. Pan American asserts a misconstruction by the court below of the "arguably lawful" criterion based on its failure "to note the clear difference between the wording of Section 412 of the Aviation Act and the wording of Section 15 of the Shipping Act * * *" (Petition, p. 8). This supposed misconstruction is asserted to have led the Court of Appeals into committing the basic error of denying to the CAB a power of retroactive validation of agreements not previously filed (Petition, pp. 8, 9).

The court was perfectly aware of the distinction between the Shipping Act outlawry of conduct implementing contracts prior to approval and the silence of the Aviation Act's §412 on the subject. Repeatedly, the court recognized the CAB's power of retroactive, validating approval, e.g.,

> "* * * if the complaint did not allege that the agreement had terminated, the Board would have primary jurisdiction and no antitrust suit could proceed until the Board issued an order approving or disapproving the agreement." (Petition, p. 9A.)

In commenting on *S. S. W., Inc.* v. *Air Transport Association*, 191 F. 2d 658 (D. C. Cir. 1951), *cert. denied*, 343 U. S. 955 (1952) and *Apgar Travel Agency* v. *International Air Transport Association*, 107 F. Supp. 706 (SDNY 1952), the court below said of *Apgar* (Petition, p. 10A):

> "* * * The district court followed the *S. S. W.* case and stayed the action pending an administrative determination of the validity of the agreement under the Civil Aeronautics Act, although the alleged agreement had never been filed with the Board. * * *"

What Pan American really challenges is not a failure to distinguish between differing immunizing statutes, but the distinction drawn by the court below between conduct under unfiled agreements beginning in the past but exerting a present impact and instances of conduct and agreements that have terminated without likelihood of repetition. That distinction is based on Aviation Act authority alone, without reference to the Shipping Act. Thus (Petition, p. 14A):

> "This is not a case where the past is prologue to present problems. See *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States*, 371 U. S. at 310. The allegations of the complaint relate to actions that have been completed. Here one plaintiff is bankrupt, the other is insolvent and neither is in operation."

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. *United States*, 371 U. S. 296 (1963) is replete with observations on the necessity for the presence of an element of currency amenable to the Board's remedial powers for the CAB to have a jurisdictional interest in a case, e.g., 371 U. S. at 303, footnote 7, referring to "reasonable probability" "at the time of suit"; the capacity of a transaction to be "undone" or "allowed to continue" (at 310); and authority in the CAB to deal with an "evil at hand" (at 312).

§414 of the Aviation Act, while not proscribing the implementation of unimmunized agreements as does the Shipping Act, plainly says that the purpose and scope of an immunizing order go as far "* * * as may be necessary *to enable* such person *to do* anything authorized, approved or required by such order." (Emphasis supplied.)

Although the court below has not expressly or necessarily ruled to the contrary, Pan American's assertion that the CAB "clearly has statutory power" to "validate an agreement that is no longer in effect" (Petition, p. 9) is more than questionable. Short of providing a gratuitous defense to a lawsuit, such an order would enable no one to do anything.

Nor was the Court of Appeals wrong in characterizing the stay of the lawsuit until Allied exhausted administrative "remedies" as a futile gesture. Manifestly money dam-

ages are the only meaningful remedy for a terminated wrong, a remedy the CAB is powerless to give. The very core of *Pan American World Airways, Inc.* v. *United States*, 371 U. S. 296 (1963) was a holding by this Court that the CAB had remedies to deal with the situation—a broad injunctive range inclusive of the power to order divestiture. Cf. *Georgia* v. *Pennsylvania R. Co.*, 324 U. S. 439 (1945). The distinction drawn by the court below between a demand for money damages as against, or in combination with, a prayer for injunctive relief, is far from the statement of an arbitrary rule, but rather represents a thoughtful balancing of the interrelationship among inherently applicable remedies, powers, and respective jurisdiction as between the CAB and the district courts.

Seen in the foregoing light, the court's appropriation of *Carnation's* (383 U. S. 213) "arguably lawful" terminology shrinks in scale to what the context plainly indicates it means, a threshold judicial inquiry as to whether there is a genuine issue of administrative immunization of the complained of activity. Thus (Petition, p. 13A):

> "The case before us is in all respects analogous to the *Carnation* case except that the alleged agreement concededly has not been passed upon by the CAB. Without CAB approval actions pursuant to an agreement are not immune from the antitrust laws. * * * * Since defendant's conduct is not arguably lawful under the Federal Aviation Act and plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief, we see no reason why the antitrust action should not proceed. * * * *"

More important is the accord between *Carnation Co.* v. *Pacific Westbound Conference, supra*, and the instant case in finding that an award of treble damages for past and

completed conduct, unimmunized by agency approval under the appropriate statute, works no conflict between court and agency, an avoidance of conflict constituting the prime objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction:

> "In deciding whether or not an alleged unfiled agreement no longer in force violated the antitrust laws, the district court would not be interfering with the Board's power to immunize this or similar agreements in the future under the criteria of §102 of the Federal Aviation Act, * * *" (Petition, p. 14A.)

Pan American has not demonstrated error in the opinion below.

2. The holding here represents an exceptional case of special circumstances combining to keep the case from referral to the CAB. Termination of antitrust misconduct, termination of the agreement, a failure to file the agreement, absence of a CAB order of immunizing approval, absence of an unfair competitive practice proceeding before the CAB in the matter, confinement of the suit to a demand for money damages, absence from the suit of a prayer for injunctive relief, non-involvement in the suit of rate, routing and rebate questions, and non-preclusion of the CAB from approving the same or similar agreements in future cases, have *all* been held necessary in making out a case against primary jurisdiction cession to the CAB. Far from posing a threat to the integrity of the regulatory scheme that will "have great impact upon the scheme of regulation of air carriers and the administration of the antitrust laws" as Pan American contends by way of conclusion (Petition, pp. 11, 12), this exception, by its narrowness, actually emphasizes the broad scope of the CAB's powers.

What the opinion does offer is relief, in the sorely tried private sector, against hit and run predation, an area where the application for stay or dismissal in favor of asserted primary jurisdiction is all too often a successful gambit in the tactics of attrition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should deny the Petition for Certiorari.

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